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P.: Criminal Law--Delay in Arraignment--Admissibility of Confessions
CASE COMMENTS
CamuNAL LAw-DELAY IN ARAIGNMENT-ADmIISSmnIITY OF
CONMSESIONS.-Petitioner, a nineteen year old lad of limited intelligence who was arrested by police on suspicion of rape, was questioned for half an hour, then given a lie detector test, and subjected
to another lie detector test after four more hours of detention, before he confessed to the crime. Although arraignment could have
been effected the afternoon of the arrest, the police did not bring
the petitioner before a commissioner until the next morning. Held,
that arraignment "without unnecessary delay", as required by FED.
R. Cmm. P. 5(a), 18 U.S.C. (1946), is not made, and a confession
obtained by the police during a period of delay is not admissible,
where the police detained the accused for an extended period between arrest and arraignment for purposes other than administrative
details. Mallory v. United States, 77 Sup. Ct. 1356 (1957).
The prevailing line of authority prior to McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1948), upon the admissibility of confessions,
was expressed in Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942), wherein the
Court held that the criteria to be used in determining the admissibility of a confession was whether or not it was given voluntarily.
See also, Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 618 (1896); 3 WiGom,
EvM.ENCE § 822 (3d ed. 1940). The fact that Mallory, or any accused, had confessed while detained and his arraignment delayed
would have been merely an element to be considered in this regard.
Chambers v. Florida,309 U.S. 227 (1940). The McNabb case, however, held that under FED. R. Cm. P. 5(a) (which requires that
any person arrested be brought without unnecessary delay before
the nearest available commissioner), even a voluntary confession
obtained from one illegally detained due to failure to arraign the
prisoner promptly would be held inadmissible by virtue of the
illegal delay. Note well, nevertheless, that, even under the McNabb
rule, a confession legally obtained is not rendered inadmissible
by a subsequent illegal detention. United States v. Mitchell, 322
U.S. 65 (1944). Certain of the lower federal courts, either misapprehending the holding in the McNabb case, or attempting to
circumvent the implications of the McNabb rule, held that in the
absence of "third degree" tactics by police officers, the rule would
not apply. See, e.g., United States v. Heitner, 149 F.2d 105 (2d
Cir. 1945); United States v. Corn, 54 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Wisc.
1944). Mr. Justice Black, in the famous Upshaw case, reiterated the
law of the McNabb case and was explicit in ruling that ". . . the
plain purpose of the requirement that prisoners should promptly
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be taken before committing magistrates was to check resort by
police officers to secret interrogations of persons accused of crime;"
and that, moreover, the voluntary or involuntary character of a
confession obtained before arraignment is of no moment in cases
where arraignment is not effected as expeditiously as practical.
Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
In applying the McNabb rule as amplified by the Upshaw
case, the federal courts were apparently not persuaded that the
Supreme Court had settled the question of an unnecessary delay
as affecting the admissibility of a confession obtained during the
delay. Several decisions illustrated the lower court's impression
that an illegal detention before presentment to a committing
magistrate, standing alone, does not invalidate a confession made
during its continuance. See, e.g., Allen v. United States, 202 F.2d
329 (1952); Haines v. United States, 188 F.2d 546 (1951). Still
other federal decisions followed the McNabb and Upshaw cases,
supra. Garner v. United States, 174 F.2d 499 (1949).
The principal case, in reaffirming the McNabb rule, should do
much to encourage and establish unanimity of opinion in the federal courts regarding the effect of an illegal detention upon a confession obtained during its continuance. Mr. Justice Frankfurter
has written a clear and lucid manual on the law of arrest and
detention for federal officers. Arrest must not be based upon
.mere suspicion but only on probable cause;" arraignment is to be
effected "as quickly as possible" so that the issue of probable cause
may be determined and the prisoner be apprised of his rights; the
Court does not, however, command "mechanical or automatic"
obedience; rather, the Court grants to policemen a limited area of
tolerance within which to operate effectively, and to pause, perhaps, to check a story volunteered by the accused. Mallory v.
United States, 77 Sup. Ct. 1536, 1539 (1957). The evil sought to
be prevented is that of a deliberate delay in arraignment to afford
an opportunity for secret interrogation.
The problem of admissibility of evidence obtained between
arrest and arraignment presents a classic situation of frequently
conflicting interest: the protection of individual rights as opposed
to adequate social protection.
There are several examples of failure to convict guilty persons
because of the operation of the McNabb rule. United States v.
Klee, 50 F. Supp. 679 (D.C. Wash. 1943). Law enforcement agen-
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cies argue that a policeman, acting with the most commendable
motives and abstaining from any techniques of physical or psychological coercion, may merely detain the prisoner for a sufficient time to interrogate him concerning the crime, only to discover that to question an accused person before an alibi can be
devised and at the time when the individual is most favorably
disposed toward confession and repentence, is to violate the requirements of criminal procedure. From this point of view, society
is compelled to suffer doubly when the voluntary confession of an
accused is vitiated by the wrongdoing of a policeman.
The Court, however, imbued with the spirit of civil libertarianism, has adopted the more enlightened view and ruled
that the possible sacrifice of social safety is of no consequence
when weighed against the prospect of delayed arraignment, the
temptation of intensive interrogation, and the ultimate use of the
"third degree," before an individual is acquainted with his rights
by being brought before a commissioner. Not only must the individual be informed of his privileges, but of equal importance is
the fact that, without prompt arraignment and a determination of
whether the arrest was founded on "probable cause" or mere
suspicion, the law enforcement agencies would be free to arrest
upon mere suspicion, hold the suspect imcommunicado, subject
him to the "third degree" and to obtain convictions with confessions obtained by such reprehensible methods.
To suggest that innocent persons have nothing to fear from
the hazards of these abuses, that only the criminal element will be
affected, is to approve the indefensible methods of a former period
which our more sophisticated society may desire to avoid.
R. G. P.
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legislative committee, in pursuance of
investigating a parole violation, announced that it would hold a
public hearing in which a tape recording of conversations between
an attorney and his client would be disclosed. The attorney and
client sought an injunction to restrain the committee from using the
recording in such manner, alleging that the conversations were
recorded, illegally and without consent, in the consulting room of
the county jail. The decision of the Supreme Court at Special Term
granting the injunction was reversed by the Appellate Division.
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